Published on Global Research.ca, by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Oct. 17, 2009.
Since 1947, India has not fully pledged itself to any camp or global pole during the Cold War and as a result was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (N.A.M.). Since the post-Cold War era that position has eroded. New Delhi has been gradually moving away from its traditional position, relationships, and policies in the international arena for over a decade.
India has been vied for as an ally in the “Great Game” that is underway, once again. This round of the “Great Game” is, however, being played under a far broader spectrum than the one played between Britain and Czarist Russia. In question is the Indian power relationship with two geo-political entities: the first is the “Periphery” and the second is “Eurasia.”
The Periphery and Eurasia: Vying for India on a Geo-Strategic Chessboard: … //
… New Delhi Deepens ties with the U.S., NATO, and Israel:
In military terms, there is a real strategic “American-Indian-Israeli Axis.” New Delhi’s strategic ties with the U.S., NATO, and Israel have been deepening. The strategic axis formed by the U.S., India, and Israel has also been denounced by various political parties and figures across the political landscape of India.
Firstly, the geo-strategic rationale for an alliance between the U.S. and India is the encirclement or containment of the People’s Republic of China. The other rationale or intentions of such cooperation are the neutralization of Russia as a player in Central Asia and the securing of energy resources for both the U.S. and India. In this project, the U.S. sees India as a natural counter-weight to China. The U.S. also has used India in its objective of trying to isolate Iran.
In regards to Tel Aviv, Israel sees India as part of a broader periphery. This broader or so-called “new periphery” was imagined and utilized as a basis of geo-strategy by Tel Aviv after 1979 when the “old periphery” that included Iran, which was one of Israel’s closest allies, buckled and collapsed with the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  In this context, Israel’s “new periphery” has been conceptualized against both the Arab World and Iran (or compounded as the Arabo-Iranian World). This is why the Israeli relationships with India, Georgia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Turkey are important, and in some cases full fledged alliances. 
Likewise NATO and India also have shared interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia, which India sees as part of its own periphery or “near abroad.” These shared interests and the mutual animosity to Chinese energy interests in Central Asia has brought India and NATO, led by the U.S., into the same camp. NATO also sees India as a military partner in its strategy to become a global military alliance. In addition, dealing with Pakistan is also another shared commonality between NATO and India.
The Project for “Greater South Asia” and Indian Ambitions in its “Near Abroad” … //
… India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA): “Superalignment” or “Counter-Alignment?”
In addition, the U.S. is trying to use the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, a loose trilateral alliance of go-between states, against China, Venezuela (and its Latin American bloc that can be called the Bolivarian Bloc), Russia, and Iran. In reality and simplistic terms the IBSA powers are rising, second tier global players. They originally appeared to be engaging in a policy of “superalignment,” the cultivation of strategic relations with all major powers and blocs, as opposed to “counter-alignment.” A global web of alliances, counter-alliances, cross-cutting, and intersecting alliances are beginning to come into view, just like the environment in Europe and the Middle East on the eve of the First World War.
Despite the fact that Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, along with Germany and the Austro-Hungarians, it decided to side with the Triple Entente after secret negotiations and promises that were never honoured by Britain and France. There are circles in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran that believe that India could act treacherously just as Italy did by not honouring its obligations to its allies, Vienna and Berlin. These suspicions also see this as a possibility even if India entered the SCO as a full member and joined the Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition in Eurasia.
In the frankest words, India, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa are benefiting from the compounded friction between the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, China, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia. To clarify, the reason that this friction is best described as compounded is because the Anglo-American alliance and the Franco-German entente work as two separate sub-units and sometimes align with the interests of opposing powers. This is also true about cooperation between Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and China. In Eurasia, Russia and Iran sometimes work as a pair, while Russia and China or China and Iran do so at other times. This trend in regards to the Eurasians, however, is changing as the cohesion between Russia, China, and Iran increases.
This behaviour is observable in the positions of both India and Brazil on Kosovar Independence. Both the foreign ministers of India and Brazil, Celso Amorim and Pranab Mukherjee, made a joint statement in Brasilia about the declaration of independence by Kosovo by announcing that India and Brazil were studying its legal ramifications under a wait-and-see policy of the “evolving situation” as Pranab Mukherjee called it. 
The Case of Elitism: Where the Indian Elites Stand: … (full huge long text and Notes 1 – 23).